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Abstract
We analyze the competitive e¤ects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting
with many competing rms. We show that rms can sustain the monopoly outcome if
they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to
increasing the number of rms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also
investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment
of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally,
policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are
derived.
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1 Introduction
A cross-license is an agreement between two rms that allows each to use the others patents
(Shapiro, 2001; Régibeau and Rockett, 2011). Cross-licensing has long been a common prac-
tice. For instance, Taylor and Silberston (1973) report that cross-licensing accounts for a
signicant share of all licensing arrangements in many industries: 50% in the telecommu-
nications and broadcasting industry, 25% in the electronic components industry, 23% in
the pharmaceutical industry, etc.1 Cross-licensing is therefore likely to have an impact on
competition in a large number of sectors.
Cross-licensing agreements involve both technological and monetary transfers. Techno-
logical transfers are generally perceived as pro-competitive: they can result in goods being
produced at lower costs by potentially more rms. These transfers are particularly useful
in Information Technology (IT) industries, such as the semiconductor and mobile phone in-
dustries, where the intellectual property rights necessary to market a product are typically
held by a large number of parties, a situation known as a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001; DOJ
and FTC, 2007; Galasso and Schankerman, 2010).2 Monetary transfers, however, can be
anticompetitive. More specically, high per-unit royalties can allow rms to sustain high
prices.
The following natural question arises: do cross-licensing partners have incentives to agree
on high royalties? The existing literature provides an answer to this question in a duopoly set-
ting: in that case, two rms can sign a cross-licensing agreement that species royalties high
enough to replicate the monopoly prot (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Fershtman and Kamien,
1992). This monopolization result can be generalized in a straightforward way to a setting
with more than two rms signing a multilateral agreement involving all of them (see Section
2.2).
However, in practice, we often see bilateral cross-licensing in industries with more than
two rms. In this setting, would any pair of rms agree on high royalties that might weaken
their competitive positions vis-à-vis their rivals? We build a model to investigate whether
bilateral cross-licensing agreements can still allow rms to sustain the monopoly outcome in
this scenario.
1In particular, cross-licensing in the semiconductor industry has received much attention in the literature
(Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Galasso, 2012).
2According to FTC (2011, pp.55-56), "The IT patent landscape involves products containing a multitude
of components, each covered by numerous patents. ... This contrasts with the relationship between products
and patents in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries where innovation is generally directed at producing
a discrete product covered by a small number of patents." Patent thickets raise many concerns and are
considered as one of the most crucial intellectual property issues of the day (Shapiro, 2007; Régibeau and
Rockett, 2011).
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We consider N(> 2) competing rms owning one patent each. Firms can get access to
the technologies covered by their rivalspatents through cross-licensing agreements, before
competing in a product market. We suppose that the larger the set of patented technologies
a rm has access to, the lower its marginal cost.3
We assume that cross-licensing contracts are private, i.e., their terms are observable only
to the parties signing them, and focus on bilaterally e¢ cient agreements. A set of cross-
licensing agreements is said to be bilaterally e¢ cient if each agreement maximizes the joint
prot of the pair of rms who sign it, given all other agreements.4 Note that a rms overall
prot is composed of the prot it makes from selling its product and the revenues generated
by the licensing of its technology.
In Section 2, we analyze our baseline model in which rms are symmetric and engage in
Cournot competition. We focus on symmetric equilibria where any two distinct rms sign a
cross-licensing contract and every rm pays the same royalty to any other rm. Two rms
in a given coalition can indirectly a¤ect their joint output through the royalties they charge
each other. When deciding these royalties, they take into account two opposite e¤ects: the
coordination e¤ect, which captures the idea that the two rms have joint incentives to restrict
their joint output below its non-cooperative equilibrium level, and the royalty-saving e¤ect
which refers to the idea that the coalitions marginal cost is lower than each of its members
marginal cost because the royalties the two rms charge each other are internal transfers
within the coalition. The royalty-saving e¤ect provides incentives to reduce the royalties
charged by each rm to the other one, whereas the coordination e¤ect provides incentives
to increase these royalties. We show that these two e¤ects cancel out when the (symmetric)
per-unit royalty is equal to the one that maximizes the industry prot. This implies that the
monopoly outcome can be sustained through bilaterally e¢ cient cross-licensing agreements.
We show that this monopolization result extends to an environment in which cross-
licensing agreements can be signed by coalitions of any size (Section 3.1). We also establish
in Section 3.3 that this nding holds in a general two-stage game that applies to any situation
in which rms that have interactions in a product market sell inputs to each other through
bilateral agreements. Examples include not only cross-licensing of patents but also two-
way access pricing in telecommunications (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey, Tirole, 1998a,b),
interconnection among Internet backbone companies (Crémer, Rey and Tirole, 2000) and in-
terbank payments for the use of ATMs (Donze and Dubec, 2006). Section 3.4 further extends
the general two-stage game to two overlapping networks of bilateral agreements.
3Via a change in variables, there is a way to interpret the model so that, rather than being cost reducing,
the patented technology enhances consumersvaluation for the product being sold. See the Appendix for
details.
4A more precise statement is provided in Denition 1.
2
In Section 3.2, we provide an extension of the baseline model which incorporates ex
post usage constraints. In the baseline model, rm i pays to rm j the royalty specied in
their cross-licensing agreement regardless of whether the former uses the latters patented
technology. This can lead to royaties that are higher than the cost reduction derived from
the use of a given licensed technology. However, competition authorities usually prohibit the
use of royalties that are disproportionate with respect to the market value of the license.
Therefore, we introduce an ex post usage constraint such that the royalty is paid only if
rm i uses rm js patented technology. We show that our previous result extends naturally
in the sense that there exists an equilibrium in which every patented technology is licensed
at a symmetric royalty and every rm uses all the patented technologies. The symmetric
royalty is equal to the minimum between the monopoly royalty and the highest royalty that
satises the ex post usage constraint for all patented technologies. However, the equilibrium
symmetric royalty becomes smaller as patents become more substitutable. In particular,
for (almost) perfectly substitutable patents, the symmetric equilibrium leads (almost) to the
most competitive outcome. For this reason, we also study whether bilateral cross-licensing can
lead to the exit of some rm(s) in a setting where N = 3 hold almost perfectly substitutable
patents. We nd that the monopoly outcome cannot be sustained but the duopoly outcome
can be sustained through bilateral cross-licensing agreements.
We lay out the policy implications of our ndings in Section 4. Both American and Eu-
ropean competition authorities grant antitrust safety zone to (cross-) licensing agreements
signed by rms whose combined market share is below a certain threshold.5 These policies
are partly based on the presumption that market forces can discipline cross-licensing partners
regarding the level of royalties they agree on: rms with relatively low market power are ex-
pected to nd it unprotable to charge each other high per-unit royalties. Our analysis shows
that such disciplining e¤ect does not exist when rms can engage in multiple cross-licensing
agreements. Therefore, it does not support the use of antitrust automatic exemptions for
bilateral cross-licensing agreements based only on a market-share criterion. Moreover, our
ndings suggest that cross-licensing contracts that require licensees to pay per-unit royal-
ties regardless of the actual use of the licensed technology should not be exempted as they
allow rms to sustain the monopoly outcome through bilateral cross-licensing agreements.
Finally, our analysis shows that alleviating the collusive potential of bilateral cross-licensing
5For instance, Article 10 of the EC Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation provides antitrust
exemption to bilateral licensing agreements between competitors if their combined market share does not
exceed 20%. Similarly, according to the US guidelines (DOJ and FTC, 1995, p.22), "... the Agencies will
not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially
anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of
each relevant market signicantly a¤ected by the restraint."
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agreements may come at the cost of increasing their exclusionary potential.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Baseline Model
2.1 Setting
Consider an industry consisting of N  3 symmetric rms producing a homogeneous good.
Each rm owns one patent covering a cost-reducing technology and can get access to its rivals
patented technologies through cross-licensing agreements. We assume that the patents are
symmetric in the sense that the marginal cost of a rm only depends on the number of
patented technologies it has access to. Let c(n) be a rms marginal cost when it has access
to a number n 2 f1; :::; Ng of technologies with c(N)( c)  c(N   1)  :::  c(1)( c).
We consider a two-stage game in which, prior to engaging in Cournot competition, each
pair of rms can sign a cross-licensing agreement whereby each party gets access to the
patented technology of the other one. More precisely, the two-stage game is described as
follows:
 Stage 1: Cross-licensing
Distinct rms i and j decide whether to sign a cross-licensing contract and determine the
terms of the contract if any. We assume that a bilateral cross-licensing contract between rm
i and rm j species a pair of royalties (ri!j; rj!i) 2 [0;+1)  [0;+1), and a lump-sum
transfer Fi!j 2 R;6 where the notation i! j indicates that rm i is paying rm j. Note that
Fi!j = F < 0 is equivalent to Fj!i = jF j > 0 (i.e., a payment from j to i).7 All bilateral
negotiations occur simultaneously.
 Stage 2: Competition in the product market
6According to Shapiro (2001), [c]ross licenses may or may not involve xed fees or running royalties;
running royalties can in principle run in one direction or both (Shapiro, 2001, p. 127).Moreover, the FTC
found that ... nearly half of the Wireless Manufacturer licenses included a running-royalty, and nearly a
third included running-royalty and lump-sum payments (FTC, 2016, p.118).
7The lump-sum transfers make it possible to separate internal distribution of prot from joint prot
maximization, which justies the solution concept we use later (see Denition 1). However, the result and
the analysis in Section 2 hold even if we assume that a cross-licensing contract can use per-unit royalties only.
This is because we focus on symmetric equilibria, and Lemma 1 shows that, without loss of generality, we can
focus on deviations by two-rm coalitions that involve the payment of the same royalty by each rm of the
coalition to the other one. However, when bilateral cross-licensing induces some rms not to be active either
because rms have asymmetric costs (in Section 3.2) or because of the presence of ex post usage constraints
(in Section 3.3), joint prot maximization may require asymmetric royalties and then a xed fee would be
necessary to share the surplus.
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Firms compete à la Cournot with the cost structure inherited from stage 1. We assume
that cross-licensing agreements are private: the terms of the agreement between rms i and
j are known only to these two rms and, therefore, each rm k 6= i; j forms beliefs about
those terms before competing with its rivals in the product market.
We assume that the rms face an inverse demand function P () satisfying the following
standard conditions (Novshek, 1985):
A1 P () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and P 0() < 0 whenever P () > 0:
A2 P (0) > c > c > P (Q) for Q su¢ ciently large.
A3 P 0(Q) +QP 00(Q) < 0 for all Q  0 with P (Q) > 0.
These mild assumptions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium
(qi )i=1;:::;n satisfying the following (intuitive) comparative statics properties, where ci denotes
rm is marginal cost (see e.g., Amir, Encaoua and Lefouili, 2014):
i) @q

i
@ci
< 0 and @q

i
@cj
> 0 for any j 6= i; @Q
@ci
< 0 for any i, where Q =
X
i
qi is the total
equilibrium output;
ii) @

i
@ci
< 0 and @

i
@cj
> 0 for any j 6= i, where i is rm is equilibrium prot.
2.2 Benchmark: multilateral cross-licensing agreement
We consider here as a benchmark the case of a multilateral licensing agreement among all
rms. This corresponds to a closed patent pool (Lerner and Tirole, 2004), i.e., a patent pool
whose only customers are its contributors. We focus on a symmetric outcome where all rms
pay the same royalty r to each other.
Let Pm(c) be the monopoly price when each rms marginal cost is c. It is characterized
by
Pm(c)  c
Pm(c)
=
1
"(Pm(c))
; (1)
where "(:) is the elasticity of demand.
Given a symmetric royalty r, each rms marginal cost is c + (N   1)r. The rms will
agree on a royalty to achieve the monopoly price. Given a symmetric royalty r, rm i chooses
its output qi in the second stage to maximize [P (Q i + qi)  c  (N   1)r] qi + rQ i where
Q i  Q   qi is the quantity chosen by all other rms. Let rm be the royalty that leads
to the monopoly price Pm(c). Then, from the rst-order condition associated with rm is
maximization program, we have
Pm(c)  c  (N   1)rm
Pm(c)
=
1
"(Pm(c))N
: (2)
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From (1) and (2), rm is determined by
Pm(c)  c
N
= rm: (3)
Proposition 1 (Multilateral cross-licensing). Suppose that all N rms in an industry jointly
agree on a symmetric royalty. Then the royalty to which they would agree, rm, is 1=N th of
the monopoly markup (i.e., rm = (Pm(c)  c) =N). The ensuing equilibrium price is the
monopoly price, Pm(c).
2.3 Bilateral cross-licensing agreements
We rst dene our solution concept.
Denition 1 (Bilateral e¢ ciency) A set of cross-licensing agreements is bilaterally e¢ cient
if, for any i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng such that i 6= j, rms i and j cannot increase their joint prot
by changing the agreement between them, holding constant all the other agreements, and the
beliefs of all rms about the agreements they are not involved in.
As any bilateral agreement can include the payment of a xed fee, it is reasonable to
assume that a bilateral agreement signed between a pair of rms maximizes their joint prot.8
Given the private nature of the agreements, a deviation by a two-rm coalition in the cross-
licensing stage is not observed by its rivals who keep the same beliefs about the agreements
made by their competitors. Moreover, when a coalition of two rms deviates by changing
the terms of the agreement between them, each of these two rms maintains the same beliefs
about all other agreements. This assumption is the counterpart in our setting of the usual
passive-belief assumption in the literature on vertical contracting (Hart and Tirole, 1990;
McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).
Notice rst that any given pair of rms nds it (jointly) optimal to sell a license to each
other. To see why, assume that, initially, rm i does not license its patent to rm j. These
two rms can (weakly) increase their joint prot if rm i licenses its patent to rm j by
specifying the payment of a per-unit royalty rj!i equal to the reduction j!i in marginal
cost generated by rm js use of the technology covered by rm is patent.9 Such licensing
agreement would not a¤ect the rmsmarginal costs of production but would allow them to
8Our solution concept is similar to the concept of contract equilibrium (Crémer and Riordan, 1987; OBrien
and Sha¤er, 1992) and pairwise-proof contracts (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). It is also closely related to the
concept of Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains used in the bilateral monopoly/oligopoly literature (Horn and
Wolinsky, 1988; Inderst and Wey, 2003; Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran and Lee, 2017).
9In any pure-strategy equilibrium (including the symmetric equilibrium we focus on), rm i anticipates
correctly the number of technologies that rm j has access to and, therefore, can compute j!i.
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save (jointly) j!i per unit of output produced by rm j. It will therefore (weakly) increase
their joint prot.10
In what follows, we consider a symmetric situation where every pair of rms signs a bilat-
eral cross-licensing agreement specifying the same royalty. Let r denote the per-unit royalty
paid by any rm i 2 f1; :::; Ng to have access to the technology of a rm j 2 f1; :::; Ng n fig,
and S(r;N) denote the corresponding set of symmetric cross-licensing agreements. We below
study the incentives of a two-rm coalition to deviate from the symmetric royalty r under
the assumption that all rms are active (i.e., produce a positive output) no matter what
royalties the deviating coalition chooses.11
The next lemma shows that it is su¢ cient to focus on deviations such that the rms in
a deviating coalition pay the same royalty to each other. Indeed, the joint payo¤ from any
asymmetric deviation can be replicated by a symmetric one because the joint payo¤ depends
on the royalties paid by each rm to the other one only through their sum.
Lemma 1 Consider a symmetric set of cross-licensing agreements S(r;N). The joint payo¤
a coalition fi; jg gets from a deviation to a cross-licensing agreement with royalties (r^i!j; r^j!i)
depends on these royalties only through their sum r^i!j + r^j!i.
Denote f1; 2g the coalition formed by rms 1 and 2 and Q 12 the joint equilibrium output
of the rms outside this coalition when all rms charge each other a royalty r. Consider a
deviation by coalition f1; 2g and let r^ be the royalty that rms 1 and 2 charge each other.
Because agreements are private, the total equilibrium output of the other rms is stillQ 12(r):
Therefore, the equilibrium joint output Q12(r; r^) of the deviating pair is such that
Q12(r;r^)
2
is
the individual equilibrium output in a symmetric duopoly with inverse demand function
~P (Q12) = P
 
Q 12(r) +Q12

: In other words, Q12(r; r^) is given by the following rst-order
condition:
P 0 (Q(r; r^))
Q12(r; r^)
2
+ P (Q(r; r^))  (c+ (N   2) r + r^) = 0; (4)
where Q(r; r^)  Q12(r; r^) +Q 12(r) denotes the total industry output in the (second-stage)
Cournot equilibrium. Then, the considered set of symmetric agreements is bilaterally e¢ cient
if and only if:
r 2 argmax
r^0
12 (r; r^)
where
12 (r; r^)  [P (Q(r; r^))  (c+ (N   2) r)]Q12(r; r^)
10The joint prot increases strictly whenever j!i > 0 and rm j initially produces a positive quantity.
11We study equilibria in which some rm(s) are not active when we consider asymmetric costs/technologies
in Section 3.2 and when we introduce an ex post usage constraint in Section 3.3.
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is the prot of the deviating coalition. This leads to the following equivalence result:
Lemma 2 A symmetric set of cross-licensing agreements S(r;N) is bilaterally e¢ cient if
and only if
Q12(r; r) 2 argmax
Q122[0;Q12(r;0)]

P
 
Q 12(r) +Q12
  (c+ (N   2) r)Q12 + 2rQ 12(r):
Note that in Lemma 2, Q12(r; r^) increases from 0 to Q

12(r; 0) as r^ decreases from +1
to 0. The lemma means that a set of cross-licensing agreement is bilaterally e¢ cient if and
only if the joint output of a two-rm coalition in the Cournot equilibrium maximizes the
coalitions prot.
2.4 Incentives to deviate
We now study the incentives of coalition f1; 2g to marginally expand or contract its output
with respect to Q12(r; r): Note that the coalitions marginal cost at the cross-licensing stage
is c+(N   2) r whereas each of its members marginal cost at the Cournot competition stage
is c+(N   1) r. The di¤erence between the two has to do with the royalty payment between
rms 1 and 2. In what follows, we call rQ12 the royalty saving of the coalition (as compared
to a single rm producing the same quantity Q12).
The coalitions prot can be rewritten as
12 (Q12; r) =

P
 
Q12 +Q

 12(r)
  (c+ (N   1) r)Q12| {z }
P12(Q12;r)
+ r

Q12 + 2Q

 12(r)
| {z } :
T12(Q12;r)
(5)
The term P12 (Q12; r) represents the coalitions prot in the product market.
12 The term
T12(Q12; r) represents the coalitions prot in the technology (licensing) market, which is
composed of the royalty saving and the licensing revenues received from all rms outside the
coalition. We below study the e¤ect of a (local) variation of Q12 on each of the two sources
of prot.
 E¤ect on the prot in the product market
The partial derivative of P12 (Q12; r) with respect to Q12, when evaluated at Q

12(r; r), is
given by
12The prot in the product market is dened with respect to the individual marginal cost of each member
of the coalition at Stage 2. This facilitates our analysis because we can use each rms rst-order condition
at the Cournot competition stage (i.e., condition (4) where r^ is set at r ).
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@P12
@Q12
(Q12(r; r); r) = P
0 (Q(r; r))Q12(r; r) + [P (Q
(r; r))  (c+ (N   1) r)] : (6)
This derivative represents the marginal prot of the coalition in the product market and
captures a coordination e¤ect : the coalition has an incentive to reduce output below the
Cournot level Q12(r; r) because the joint output of the coalition when each member chooses
its quantity in a non-cooperative way is too large with respect to what maximizes its joint
prot in the product market. Indeed, using (4) evaluated at r^ = r, we nd that
@P12
@Q12
(Q12(r; r); r) =   [P (Q(r; r))  (c+ (N   1) r)] < 0: (7)
 E¤ect on the prot in the technology market
Let us now turn to the e¤ect of a local variation in Q12 on the coalitions prot in the
technology market T12(Q12): We have:
@T12
@Q12
(Q12(r; r); r) = r  0: (8)
A marginal increase in Q12 results in a royalty saving equal to r. We call this the royalty-
saving e¤ect, which is strictly positive for any r > 0.
It follows from (7) and (8) that for any r > 0, a marginal increase in Q12 has two opposite
e¤ects on the coalitions overall prot: the prot in the product market decreases whereas
the prot in the technology market increases.
By summing up (7) and (8), the total e¤ect of a marginal increase in Q12 on the coalitions
prot can be written as:
@12
@Q12
(Q12(r; r); r) = [c+Nr   P (Q(r; r))] : (9)
The coordination e¤ect dominates the royalty-saving e¤ect if f(r;N)  c+Nr P (Q(r; r)) <
0. For instance, when r = 0, the coordination e¤ect dominates because the prot in the
technology market is zero and we have f(0; N) = c   P (Q (0; 0)) < 0. As r increases, the
royalty saving e¤ect becomes more important: we show below that @f
@r
(r;N) = N  dQ
dr
P 0 (Q)
is strictly positive.
Summing the rst-order conditions for each rm is maximization program from i = 1
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to i = N yields
P 0 (Q)Q +NP (Q) N (c+ (N   1)r) = 0: (10)
Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to r leads to
dQ
dr
[P 0 (Q) + P 00 (Q)Q] +N

P 0 (Q)
dQ
dr
  (N   1)

= 0:
From P 0 (Q)+P 00 (Q)Q < 0 (byA3) and dQ

dr
< 0, it follows that P 0 (Q) dQ

dr
 (N 1) < 0,
which implies that @f
@r
(r;N) > 0 for any N  3. As f(r;N) strictly increases with r, the
solution in r to f(r;N) = 0 is unique whenever it exists.
Surprisingly, it turns out that the unique royalty r for which f(r;N) = 0 is the fully
cooperative royalty rm, dened in (3). At r = rm, we have P (Q(rm; rm)) = Pm (c) and,
therefore, c+Nrm P (Q(rm; rm)) = 0. Thus, the coordination e¤ect dominates the royalty-
saving e¤ect for r < rm whereas the reverse holds for r > rm.
2.5 Bilaterally e¢ cient royalties
From the previous analysis of local deviations, we know that there are two possible cases
depending on whether the coordination e¤ect dominates, or is dominated by, the royalty-
saving e¤ect. The local analysis above allowed us to identify rm a the unique candidate for
a symmetric bilaterally e¢ cient royalty.13 A global analysis (i.e., looking at global, rather
than only local, deviations) conrms that this candidate is indeed bilaterally e¢ cient. This
follows from the fact that assumptions A1 and A3 ensure that 12 (Q12; r) is concave in Q12
(see the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix). Therefore, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 (Bilaterally e¢ cient agreements) In the baseline model, a set S(r;N) of sym-
metric cross-licensing agreements is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if r = rm.
This proposition shows that the monopoly outcome is always sustainable through bilat-
erally e¢ cient cross-licensing agreements. Let us now provide the intuition for this nding.
The monopoly output Qm is dened by the following rst-order condition:
P 0(Qm)Qm + P (Qm) = c: (11)
13We say that a symmetric royalty r is bilaterally e¢ cient if the set of cross-licensing agreements S(r;N)
is bilaterally e¢ cient.
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Moreover, because rm leads to the monopoly outcome when rms compete in quantity in the
second stage, the rst-order condition with respect to a single rms output, qi, is given by:
P 0(Qm)
Qm
N
+ P (Qm) = c+ (N   1) rm: (12)
Therefore, an increase in a rms marginal cost of production by (N   1) rm makes it act as
if it were internalizing the e¤ects of its decision on its (N   1) rivals. This implies that the
payment of a per-unit royalty rm to each rival has the same e¤ect as internalizing the impact
of a price reduction on that rival. Formally, this amounts to writing
 P 0(Qm)Q
m
N
= rm; (13)
which follows immediately from (11) and (12).
Suppose now that two distinct rms i and j contemplate a joint deviation in the cross-
licensing stage. By agreeing on some royalties (ri!j; rj!i), they can choose a joint output
qi + qj di¤erent from 2Qm=N . However, it turns out that the rst-order condition for the
coalitions maximization program is satised exactly at qi + qj = 2Qm=N :
P 0(Qm)
2Qm
N
+ P (Qm) = c+ (N   2) rm; (14)
which is easily derived from (12) by adding P 0(Qm)Q
m
N
to its L.H.S. and substracting rm
from its R.H.S. The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider two rms jointly deciding
the royalties they charge each other. On the one hand, they internalize the competitive
externalities they exert on each other in the competition stage. This is the coordination
e¤ect. On the other hand, a two-rm coalitions marginal cost is lower than a single rms
marginal cost by rm; which gives the coalition an incentive to increase its output. This is
the royalty-saving e¤ect. These two e¤ects cancel out because the payment of rm is exactly
equivalent to internalizing the e¤ect of price reduction on one rival rm.
3 Extensions
In this section, we provide several extensions of the baseline model to assess the robustness
of our main result.
11
3.1 k-e¢ cient agreements
In this extension, we investigate cross-licensing agreements that are k-e¢ cient in the sense
that no coalition of size k 2 f3; :::; N   1g nds it optimal to change the terms of the cross-
licensing agreements among its members. Note that the case of k = 2 corresponds to the
bilateral e¢ ciency criterion whereas k = N corresponds to industry-prot maximization.
Let r be the symmetric royalty that every rm pays to each other rm as part of their
cross-licensing agreement. Consider the deviation of a coalition composed of K = f1; :::; kg
in the rst stage. Lemma 1 continues to hold in the case of a coalition of size k. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations involving a symmetric
royalty r^. For given (r; r^), let QK(r; r^) denote the sum of the outputs of the rms in the
coalition in the (second-stage) Cournot equilibrium. Let Q K (r) denote the joint equilibrium
output of all rms outside the coalition when they expect all rms to charge each other a
royalty r.
Then, the coalitions prot can be rewritten as
K (QK ; r) =

P
 
QK +Q

 K (r)
  (c+ (N   1) r)QK| {z }
PK(Qk;r)
+ r

(k   1)QK +Q K (r)
| {z } :
TK(Qk;r)
Consider the coalitions incentives to expand or contract its output Qk with respect to
QK(r; r). We have
@PK
@QK
(QK(r; r); r) =   [P (Q(r; r))  (c+ (N   1) r)] (k   1)
where Q(r; r^) = QK(r; r^) +Q

 K (r), and
@TK
@QK
(QK(r; r); r) = r (k   1) :
Summing up the two terms leads to
@K
@QK
(QK(r; r); r) = (k   1) [c+Nr   P (Q(r; r))] : (15)
The important point is that at r = rm, the bracket term in the R.H.S. of (15) is zero
regardless of the coalition size: c+Nrm P (Q(rm; rm)) = 0. This, combined with the fact
that K (QK ; r) is concave in QK ,14 leads to the following result:
14The proof for the concavity of K (QK ; r) with respect to QK is similar to the proof for the concavity of
12 (Q12; r) with respect to Q12 (see the proof of Proposition 2).
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Proposition 3 (k-e¢ cient agreements) In the baseline model, there exists a unique k-e¢ cient
set of symmetric agreements, in which all rms charge each other the royalty rm.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is similar to that for Proposition 2. A coalition of size k
internalizes the e¤ect of price reduction on k   1 more rms than a single rm does but the
marginal cost of the coalition is lower by (k   1)rm than that of a single rm. Therefore,
the two opposite e¤ects cancel out for any k because the payment of rm is equivalent to
internalizing the e¤ect of price reduction on one additional rm.
3.2 Ex post usage constraint
In our baseline model we assume that after rm i signs a cross-licensing contract with rm
j, the former pays the per-unit royalty ri!j regardless of whether it uses or not the latters
patented technology. Such an agreement can raise the suspicion of antitrust authorities for
two reasons. First, if a royalty is paid by a licensee that does not use the licensed technology,
then the corresponding licensing contract is a sham contract whose only e¤ect is to increase
articially marginal costs in order to sustain higher prices. Second, even when the technology
is actually used by the licensee (in equilibrium), the mere fact that the royalty would be
paid even if the technology were not used makes it possible for rms to sustain royalties that
are above the cost reduction resulting from the use of the technology. This could trigger an
antitrust investigation because competition authorities usually prohibit the use of royalties
that are disproportionate with respect to the market value of the licensed patents.15
In this extension of the baseline model, we study the scenario in which a per-unit royalty
is paid to the licensor only if the licensed technology is actually used by the licensee: in
other words, a royalty is paid to the licensor only if it satises the licensees ex post usage
constraint.16 To account for this constraint, we modify the game as follows:
 Stage 1: Cross-licensing
15Note that prohibiting licensing contracts whereby a per-unit royalty is paid by the licensee regardless of
the actual use of the technology is an indirect way of enforcing an antitrust rule prohibiting the payment of
royalties that are above the cost reduction resulting from the use of the licensed technology.
16Formally, a rm i who has signed cross-licensing agreements with a set Li of rivals will choose to use the
technologies of a subset ~Li  Li of these rms in order to minimize its marginal cost
c

1 + card

~Li

+
X
j2~Li
ri!j ;
where card

~Li

denotes the number of rms in ~Li. Note that the optimal subset ~Li may be empty and that
it may not be unique.
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Distinct rms i and j decide whether to sign a cross-licensing contract and determine
the terms of the contract if any. A bilateral cross-licensing agreement between rm i and
rm j species a pair of royalties (ri!j; rj!i) 2 R2+ and a lump-sum transfer Fi!j 2 R. All
bilateral negotiations occur simultaneously. The lump-sum transfer Fi!j is paid regardless
of whether the patented technology of j (respectively, of i) is used by i (respectively, by j).
 Stage 2: Competition in the product market
All rms simultaneously select the technologies they use among those they have access
to and choose their output. We assume that at the end of this stage, after all productions
occurred, any rm j can observe whether or not its patented technology has been used by
any rm i (6= j). The per-unit royalty ri!j is paid only if rm js patented technology is
used by rm i.
We continue to assume that bilateral cross-licensing agreements are private. In this
subsection, we assume that the marginal benet from an additional technology is (weakly)
decreasing in the number of technologies a given rm has access to:
c(1)  c(2)  c(2)  c(3)  :::  c(N   1)  c(N): (16)
In what follows, we rst study a symmetric equilibrium in which any distinct rms i
and j use each others technology and pay each other a symmetric royalty r. Consider the
benchmark scenario where rms sign a multilateral cross-licensing agreement involving all of
them. Suppose that the agreement induces all rms to pay the same royalty to each other
and to use each others patented technology. Then, it is straightforward to show that it is
optimal for the rms to agree on a symmetric royalty equal to min frm; c(N   1)  c(N)g.17
In the case of bilateral cross-licensing, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 (Ex post usage constraint and no exclusion) Assume that condition (16) holds
and that the ex post usage constraint must be satised for a royalty to be paid. Then, a set
S(r;N) of symmetric cross-licensing agreements in which every rm uses all the technologies
is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if r = min frm; c(N   1)  c(N)g.
This proposition again establishes the equivalence between multilateral cross-licensing
and bilateral cross-licensing conditional on every patented technology being licensed to and
used by all rms.
17This is optimal conditional on every rm using all the technologies. Of course, if c(k) c(k 1) decreases
very quickly with k, it may be optimal for the rms to design the multilateral agreement such that not all
rms are active. We discuss this later in this subsection.
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However, in the benchmark scenario of multilateral cross-licensing, rms may prefer to
sign an agreement which limits the access of some rm(s) to the available patented technolo-
gies. To see why, consider the extreme case in which patents are perfectly substituable in
the sense that c(N   1)   c(N) = 0. In this case, the only multilateral agreement in which
all technologies are used by all rms is the one which species a royalty r = 0. Such an
agreement would lead to the most competitive outcome because all rms compete with a
marginal cost equal to c. Firms may be able to achieve a higher industry prot by designing
a multilateral agreement such that some of them do not use all technologies. In particular, if
Pm(c) < c, the multilateral agreement that species
r1!j = 0 and rj!1 = ri!j = c(1)  c(2) for i; j 6= 1; i 6= j:
generates a cost structure (c1; c2; :::; cN) = (c; c; :::; c) and, consequently, induces the exit of
all rms j 6= 1 and leads to the highest industry prot (i.e., the monopoly prot at the lowest
possible cost c).
Therefore, it is interesting to study whether bilateral cross-licensing agreements can lead
to the exit of some rms when the condition Pm(c) < c holds. We address this question below
in a simple setting where the number of rms is N = 3 and c(1)  c(2) > c(2)  c(3) = " > 0,
and in which " is su¢ ciently small such that all three rms are active for any (c1; c2; c3) 2
[c; c+ 2"]3,18 and Pm(c+ ") < c. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5 (Ex post usage constraint and exclusion) Suppose that N = 3 and c(1)  
c(2) > c(2)   c(3) = " > 0 where " is su¢ ciently small such that all three rms are active
for any (c1; c2; c3) 2 [c; c+ 2"]3and Pm(c + ") < c. Moreover, assume that the ex post usage
constraint must be satised for a royalty to be paid.
(i) No set of bilaterally e¢ cient cross-licensing agreements can sustain an outcome in
which only one rm is active.
(ii) There exists a set of bilaterally e¢ cient cross-licensing agreements which leads to
an outcome in which only two rms are active. More specically, the set of cross-licensing
agreements characterized by
r1!2 = r2!1 = "; r1!3 = r2!3 = 0; r3!1 = r3!2 = c(1)  c(2);
F1!2 = F1!3 = F2!3 = 0;
is bilaterally e¢ cient and leads to an outcome where only rms 1 and 2 are active.
18This assumption implies Pm(c) > c+ 2".
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This proposition shows that the monopoly outcome cannot be sustained by a set of
bilaterally e¢ cient agreements. To explain why, consider a candidate equilibrium in which
rm 1 is the only rm which is active in stage 2. Firms 2 and 3 have joint incentives to
change the cross-licensing agreement between them so that they become active in stage 2:
they will still get the same licensing revenues from rm 1 (who will keep producing the same
output as before because the agreements are private) and, in addition, they will make positive
market prots. Moreover, rms 2 and 3 have the joint ability to become active: by signing a
cross-licensing agreement such that r2!3 = r3!2 = 0, they have marginal costs that do not
exceed c+ ", which allows them to be active in stage 2.
However, the duopoly outcome can be sustained. The bilateral cross-licensing agreements
described in Proposition 5(ii) generates the following cost structure (c1; c2; c3) = (c+"; c+"; c),
which implies that rm 3 is not active. Surprisingly, rms 1 and 2 can exclude rm 3 without
making any compensation to it. The agreements are bilaterally e¢ cient as no coalition has
an incentive to deviate. First, the coalition f1; 2g has no incentive to deviate. To see this,
note that ri!3 = 0 for i = 1; 2 implies that no matter the agreement between rm 1 and
2, rm i is active as its marginal cost cannot be higher than c + ". Given this, bilateral
e¢ ciency requires rm 1 and 2 to use (r1!2; r2!1) to reduce the most their joint output
while satisfying the ex post usage constraints, which is achieved by setting r1!2 = r2!1 = ".
Second, the coalition of rms 1 and 3 has no incentive to deviate either. No matter the
agreement between rms 1 and 3, the lowest marginal cost of the coalition is c+ " = c1 and
the joint prot maximization requires to produce the best response output at this marginal
cost with respect to q2 = qD(c+"; c+"), the output chosen by rm 2 in the duopoly structure.
This best-response output is exactly what rm 1 produces in the equilibrium candidate.
The following general message can be obtained from Proposition 4 and 5. If the multilat-
eral agreement that maximizes the industry prot induces all rms to be active and to use all
technologies, this outcome can also be achieved by bilateral agreements. This situation arises
in particular when the ex post usage constraint is not binding for the equilibrium royalty. In
contrast, if the ex post usage constraint limits severely the royalties that rms can charge
each other, industry prot maximization under a multilateral agreement may require some
rms not to be active. In particular, when Pm(c) < c, a multilateral agreement making only
one rm use all technologies at zero per-unit royalty and no other rm use any of its competi-
torstechnologies leads to the monopoly outcome (associated to the lowest possible marginal
cost c). In this case, there is a (signicant) di¤erence between a multilateral agreement and
a set of bilateral agreements: the most exclusionary outcome, i.e., the monopoly outcome,
may not be sustainable by bilateral agreements although some rm(s) may be excluded under
bilateral agreements.
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3.3 A general class of games
We now develop a general model that can also be applied to situations di¤erent from the
cross-licensing of patents, and show that our main result extends to that general setting.
Consider the following two-stage game played by N(> 2) number of rms:
 Stage 1 (bilateral agreements in the input market): Every pair of distinct rms (i; j)
signs a bilateral agreement which species a pair of input prices (ri!j; rj!i) as well as
a pair of xed transfers (Fi!j; Fj!i). All bilateral negotiations occur simultaneously.
 Stage 2 (competition in the product market): Firms choose non-cooperatively and
simultaneously their actions xi. At this stage, each rm i only knows the input prices
(ri!j; rj!i) and the xed transfers (Fi!j; Fj!i) involving it.
Let r  ((ri!j; rj!i))1i<j<N , F  ((Fi!j; Fj!i))i6=j , x = (xi)i and denote i (x;r;F )
player is payo¤ function. Moreover, let x ij denote the vector obtained from vector x by
removing xi and xj and r ij the vector obtained from r by removing ri!j and rj!i.
We set the following assumptions regarding the e¤ects of transfers on payo¤s:
G1 For any i; there exists a function i such that, for any (x;r;F ), i (x;r;F ) =
i (x;r) +
P
j 6=i
(Fj!i   Fi!j)
G2 For any distinct i and j and any x, i (x;r) + j (x;r) does not depend on ri!j.
G3 For any distinct i; j; k and any x, k (x;r) does not depend on ri!j.
We also make the following technical assumptions:
G4 For any r, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium x (r) to the second-stage subgame.
G5 For any r, any distinct i and j and any
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i

, the two-player game (played
by rms i and j) derived from the second-stage subgame by xing the action of each player k =2
fi; jg to xk (r) has a unique Nash equilibrium
 
~xi
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r ij;x

 ij (r)

; ~xj
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r ij;x

 ij (r)

:
G6 There exists a unique vector xm of second-stage actions that maximizes the joint
payo¤ of all players; moreover the joint payo¤ function is di¤erentiable at xm and the latter
is the unique solution to the corresponding system of F.O.Cs.
This general model can be applied to many economic situations, including:
- Cross-licensing: ri!j is a per-unit royalty paid by patent holder i to patent holder j
and xi is a price or a quantity chosen by i. Note that the general model applies not only to
the case in which cross-licensing partners produce substitutable goods but also to the case
in which they produce complementary goods.
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- Two-way access pricing in telecommunication networks: ri!j is the access charge paid by
network i to network j and xi is the linear retail price charged by network i to its customers
(see Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a, 1998b) for a duopolistic setting).
- Interconnection among Internet backbone companies: ri!j is the access charge paid by
backbone company i to j in a transit agreement and xi is the capacity choice made by i (see
Crémer, Rey and Tirole (2000)).
- Interbank payments for the use of ATMs: ri!j is the interchange fee paid by bank i to
bank j and xi is the number of ATMs deployed by bank i (see Donze and Dubec (2006) for
a setting with multilateral negotiation of the interchange fee).
Note that the general model introduced above is not a generalization of our baseline model
of cross-licensing in a strict sense. First, in contrast to the cross-licensing model, input prices
can take positive as well as negative values. This rules out non-interior equilibria, which
simplies the analysis by making it possible to rely on rst-order conditions. Second, the
rst stage of our general model is slightly di¤erent from that of the cross-licensing model:
in the latter, we assumed that rms can decide not to sign an agreement in the rst stage
whereas in the former, it is implicitly assumed that each pair of rms signs an agreement
(the only decision variable is the terms of their agreement). However, this restriction does
not entail any loss of generality when rmsincentives are such that each pair of rms nds
it jointly protable to sign a bilateral agreement. This is in particular the case if we apply
the general model to cross-licensing as the argument we provided between Denition 1 and
Lemma 1 still applies. Moreover, the assumption that all pairs of rms sign an agreement is
also satised in the scenario where a regulator makes it mandatory for rms to agree with
each other regarding access to particular inputs. This is, for instance, typically the case with
interconnection among telecommunication companies.
We now introduce the following denitions which generalize those adopted in our cross-
licensing model:
Denition 2 A vector r of input prices is fully cooperative if
r 2 Argmax
r0
NX
i=1
i (x
 (r0) ; r0) :
Denition 3 A vector r of input prices is bilaterally e¢ cient if for any (i; j) with i 6= j, the
following holds:
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(ri!j; rj!i) 2 Argmax
(r0i!j ;r0j!i)
"
i
 
~xi
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r ij;x

 ij (r)

; ~xj
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r ij;x

 ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

+j
 
~xi
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r ij;x

 ij (r)

; ~xj
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r ij;x

 ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij
 #
Let D denote the set of vectors r of input prices such that for any (i; j), xj (:) and ~x

j (:)
are di¤erentiable with respect to all their arguments at r and i (:; r) is di¤erentiable with
respect to all its arguments at x (r) :19 The following lemma provides a su¢ cient condition
for a vector r 2 D of input prices to be fully cooperative. This condition also ensures that a
multilateral agreement in the input market involving all rms leads to the monopoly outcome
in the product market.
Lemma 3 A su¢ cient condition for a vector of input prices r 2 D to be fully cooperative is
that for any j 2 f1; :::; Ng ;
NX
i=1
@i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0: (17)
Moreover, when this condition is met, the fully cooperative agreements in the input market
leads to the fully cooperative outcome in the product market.
We now provide a necessary condition for a vector of input prices in D to be bilaterally
e¢ cient.
Lemma 4 Assume that, for any r 2 D and any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; Ng2with i 6= j, we have
@~xi
@ri!j
@~xj
@ri!j
@~xi
@rj!i
@~xj
@rj!i
 6= 0; (18)
where the argument
 
ri!j; rj!i;x ij (r)

is omitted. Then, a necessary condition for a vector
of input prices r 2 D to be bilaterally e¢ cient is that
@i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0
for any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; Ng2such that i 6= j.
The rank condition (18) means that ri!j and rj!i are independent instruments in the
sense that any local deviation in the product market can be obtained through a local deviation
19Note that in usual quantity/price competition games, the subset of r =2 D is typically of zero measure
under standard regularity assumptions.
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in the input market. This condition ensures that the set of instruments in the input market
is rich enough to implement any desired actions in the product market. Let us show that it
is satised, for instance, in the simple context of the previous cross-licensing model with a
Cournot oligopoly featuring (potentially asymmetric) linear costs and linear (inverse) demand
p = a Q. Then we have 
@~xi
@ri!j
@~xj
@ri!j
@~xi
@rj!i
@~xj
@rj!i
 =

@~xi
@ci
@~xj
@ci
@~xi
@cj
@~xj
@cj
 = 19 > 0:
Note that in environments in which the second stage takes the form of a Cournot game
and the input prices a¤ect only the marginal cost of production (such as our cross-licensing
example), Condition (18) means that own-cost e¤ects (on output) are not equal to cross-cost
e¤ects. In fact, in imperfect competition models, the property that own-cost e¤ects strictly
dominate cross-cost e¤ects is quite standard (see e.g., Vives, 1999).
Using the previous two lemmas, it is straightforward to get the following result about the
cooperative potential of bilateral agreements in the input market.
Proposition 6 Assume that Condition (18) holds for any r 2 D and any distinct i; j 2
f1; :::; Ng. Then a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of input prices r 2 D is necessarily fully coop-
erative.
In contrast to the baseline cross-licensing model, we do not establish the existence of a
bilaterally e¢ cient vector of input prices in the current general framework.20 We however
show that whenever a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of input prices exists, it will maximize the
N rmsjoint prot.
3.4 Overlapping networks
So far we have considered a single network of bilateral agreements: we assumed that any
pair of rms can sign a bilateral agreement. We depart now from that setting and consider
instead two potentially overlapping networks.21 More specically, consider the general model
in Section 3.4 and assume that there are two subsets S1 and S2 of rms such that two
distinct rms i and j sign a bilateral agreement in stage 1 if and only if (i; j) 2 S1  S1 or
(i; j) 2 S2S2. Moreover, assume that these two subsets cover the whole set of rms S, i.e.,
20This would essentially amount to showing that a given system of N(N   1) rst-order equations with
N(N   1) unknowns has at least one solution. This turns out to be complicated because of the (fully)
asymmetric nature of the equations.
21We consider a very simple network structure in this section. See Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou
(2006) for a general structure.
20
S1 [ S2 = S = f1; :::; Ng. When S1 \ S2 6= ?, the two networks of bilateral agreements are
overlapping, whereas they are not in the special case of S1\S2 = ?: A rm in S1\S2, if any,
is connected through a bilateral agreement with any other rm in S, whereas a rm in S n
S1 \S2 is only connected to the rms in the subset (S1 or S2) it belongs to. Finally, assume
that stage 2 remains unchanged: all rms choose non-cooperatively and simultaneously their
actions.22
Dene r1  ((ri!j; rj!i))(i;j)2S1S1;i<j, r2  ((ri!j; rj!i))(i;j)2S2S2;i<j and
r1\2  ((ri!j; rj!i))(i;j)2S1\S2S1\S2;i<j as the vectors of input prices paid to each other by the
rms in S1, S2 and S1\S2 respectively. Moreover, dene r1 1\2  ((ri!j; rj!i))(i;j)2(S1S1)n(S1\S2S1\S2);i<j
as the vector of input prices paid to each other by the rms in S1 excluding the input prices
paid to each other by the rms in S1 \S2, and dene r2 1\2 in a similar way. Finally, denote
r12   r1; r2 1\2 =  r1 1\2; r2 the vector of input prices paid by all rms in S to each other,
and r12 ij the vector obtained from r
12 by removing (ri!j; rj!i). Dene in a similar way F 1,
F 2, F 1\2, F 1 1\2, F
2
 1\2, and F
12   F 1;F 2 1\2 =  F 1 1\2;F 2.
Also, let x1, x2, x1n2, x2n1 and x1\2 denote the (vector of) actions of the rms in S1, S2,
S1nS2, S2nS1, S1 \ S2 respectively. Recall that x denotes the (vector of) actions of all rms
and x ij the vector obtained from x by removing xi and xj.
We suppose that the following counterparts to assumptions G1-G6 hold:
G1For any i; there exists a function i such that, for any
 
x;r12;F 12

, i
 
x;r12;F 12

=
i (x;r
12)+
P
j2Ci
(Fj!i   Fi!j), where Ci = S1n fig for i 2 S1nS2, Ci = S2n fig for i 2 S2nS1,
and Ci = S n fig for i 2 S1 \ S2.
G2For any distinct i and j and any x, i (x;r12) + j (x;r12) does not depend on ri!j.
G3For any distinct i; j; k such that (i; j) 2 S1  S1[ S2  S2 and k 2 S, and any x,
k (x;r
12) does not depend on ri!j.
G4For any r12, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium x (r12) to the second-stage
subgame.
G5For any r12, any (i; j) 2 S1  S1[ S2  S2 and any  r0i!j; r0j!i, the two-player
game (played by rms i and j) derived from the second-stage subgame by xing the action
of each player k =2 fi; jg to xk (r12) has a unique Nash equilibrium which we denote by 
~xi
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r
12
 ij;x

 ij (r
12)

; ~xj
 
r0i!j; r
0
j!i; r
12
 ij; ;x

 ij (r
12)

:
G5For any given r12 = (r1; r2 1\2) and r
1, the game (played by the rms in S1) derived
from the second-stage subgame by xing the action of each player in S2nS1 to x2n1 (r12) has
22Again, at this stage, each rm i only knows the input prices (ri!j ; rj!i) and the xed transfers
(Fi!j ; Fj!i) involving it.
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a unique Nash equilibrium x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1 (r12)

.23 Similarly, for any r12 =
 
r1 1\2; r
2

and any r2, the game (played by the rms in S2) derived from the second-stage subgame
by xing the actions of each player in S1nS2 to x1n2 (r12) has a unique Nash equilibrium
x^2
 
r2; r1 1\2;x
1n2 (r12)

:
G6For any given actions x2n1 of the rms S2nS1 and any given r2 1\2, there exists a
unique vector ~x1
 
r2 1\2;x
2n1 that maximizes the joint payo¤ of all the rms in S1,24 and
this vector is characterized by the corresponding system of rst-order conditions.25 Similarly,
for any given actions x1n2 of the rms S1nS2 and any given r1 1\2 there exists a unique
vector ~x2
 
r1 1\2;x
1n2 that maximizes the joint payo¤ of all the rms in S2, and this vector
is characterized by the corresponding system of rst-order conditions.
We now adapt the concept of fully cooperative vectors of input prices to the current
context as follows:
Denition 4 A vector r12 = (r1; r2 1\2) =
 
r1 1\2; r
2

of input prices is intra-group fully
cooperative if
r1 2 Argmax
r1
X
i2S1
i
 
x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1  r12 ;x2n1  r12 ; r1; r2 1\2
and
r2 2 Argmax
r2
X
j2S2
j
 
x^2
 
r2; r1 1\2;x
1n2  r12 ;x1n2  r12 ; r1 1\2; r2
Note that the joint payo¤ of all the rms in S1 (resp. S2) depends only indirectly on
r1 (resp. r2) through its e¤ect on rmsequilibrium actions, but depends directly on r2 1\2
(resp. r1 1\2) through the royalties that the rms in S
1 \ S2 pay to the rms in S2nS1 (resp.
S1nS2). A vector of input prices is intra-group fully cooperative if the input prices charged
to each other by the rms belonging to the same subset maximizes their joint prot given all
the terms of the agreements involving at least one rm outside that subset.26
Let D12 denote the set of vectors r12 of input prices such that for any i 2 S, xi (:) and
~xi (:) are di¤erentiable with respect to all their arguments at r
12 and i (:; r12) is di¤erentiable
with respect to all its arguments at x (r12) :
23Note that x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1  r12 depends on its second argument r2 1\2 only through the input
prices ri!j such that i 2 S1 \ S2 and j 2 S2nS1.
24We omit the arguments of ~x1 for the sake of brevity.
25Recall that r1 does not a¤ect directly the joint payo¤ of all the rms in S1.
26In other words, a vector of input prices is intra-group fully cooperative if the coalition made of all rms
within a given subset (S1 or S2) does not nd it optimal to deviate by changing (some of) the input prices
charged to each other.
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The following proposition shows that a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of input prices is neces-
sarily intra-group fully cooperative if the rank condition (18) is satised for all i; j such that
i 6= j and (i; j) 2 S1  S1[ S2  S2.
Proposition 7 Assume that Condition (18) holds for any r12 2 D12 and any (i; j) 2 S1 
S1[ S2  S2 with i 6= j. Then, a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of input prices r122 D12 is
necessarily intra-group fully cooperative
This result generalizes Proposition 6 in the following sense: it shows that bilaterally e¢ -
cient agreements lead to the same outcome as the one resulting from two separate multilateral
agreements each involving all the rms in each subset. In other words, each multilateral agree-
ment maximizing the joint payo¤ of all rms within each subset can still be "decentralized"
through a (complete) network of e¢ cient bilateral agreements within the subset.
To explore further the properties of bilaterally e¢ cient vectors of input prices in the
current environment, we introduce the following denition:
Denition 5 A vector r12 of input prices induces fully cooperative actions of the rms in
S1 \ S2 if
x1\2
 
r12
 2 Argmax
x1\2
NX
i=1
i
 
x1\2;x1n2
 
r12

;x2n1
 
r12

; r12

Recall that, for any given vector of actions x, the industry prot does not depend on
r12. A vector of input prices induces fully cooperative actions of the rms in S1 \ S2 if their
actions maximize the industry prot.27
Proposition 8 Assume that Condition (18) holds for any r122 D12 and any (i; j) 2 S1S1[
S2  S2 with i 6= j. Then a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of input prices r122 D12 necessarily
induces fully cooperative actions of the rms in S1 \ S2.
Thus, bilateral e¢ ciency implies that those rms which sign bilateral agreements with
all other rms in the industry, i.e., the rms in S1 \ S2, choose industry-prot-maximizing
actions. Hence, as the set S1 \ S2 expands, more and more rms take industry-prot-
maximizing actions such that in the limit case where S1 = S2 = S, we obtain the monopoly
outcome as in Proposition 6.
27In other words, a vector of input prices induces fully cooperative actions of the rms in S1\S2 if it makes
these rms internalize fully the e¤ects of their (second-stage) decisions on all other rms in the industry.
23
4 Policy implications
We now discuss the policy implications of our results regarding the antitrust treatment of
bilateral cross-licensing agreements between competitors.
Competition authorities usually prohibit the use of royalties that are disproportionate
with respect to the market value of the license. For instance, according to the Guidelines on
the application of Article 101 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements (European
Commission, 2014), . . . Article 101(1) may be applicable where competitors cross license and
impose running royalties that are clearly disproportionate compared to the market value of
the licence and where such royalties have a signicant impact on market prices.However, the
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) of the European Commission
grants antitrust exemption to bilateral cross-licensing agreements between competitors if
their joint market share does not exceed 20%. In a similar vein, the competition authorities
in the U.S. grant a safe harbor to cross-licensing agreements (not necessarily bilateral) among
partners whose joint market share is below 20% (DOJ and FTC, 1995, p.22).
Our analysis does not support an antitrust exemption to bilateral cross-licensing agree-
ments based only on the joint market shares of the rms involved in those agreements.
Consider for instance the specic example of an industry comprised of ten symmetric rms.
In such setting, any bilateral cross-licensing agreements would satisfy the joint market share
criterion used by American and European antitrust authorities. However, our ndings show
that, absent any other legal restriction, such agreements can be used by rms to sustain the
monopoly outcome.
This conclusion is in line with antitrust law in the U.S. where bilateral cross-licensing
agreements cannot benet from a safe harbor if they are "facially anticompetitive" (U.S. DOJ
and FTC, 1995, p.22). Similarly, in the EU, an agreement is exempted from the benet of the
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) if it involves "hardcore restric-
tions". Our analysis sheds light on the importance of enforcing the rules that exclude some
cross-licensing agreements from an automatic exemption regime based on market shares.28 It
also suggests that one such rule should be the prohibition of cross-licensing contracts that re-
quire (per-unit) royalties to be paid regardless of whether the licensed technology is actually
used. In the case of cost-reducing technologies, under this rule, rmspost-licensing marginal
costs do not exceed their pre-licensing marginal costs, which implies that consumers cannot
be negatively a¤ected by cross-licensing.
Finally, our analysis shows that constraining the royalties that cross-licensing partners
28In other words, antitrust authorities should not rely on market forces to discipline rms with low market
shares regarding the (per-unit) royalties they charge each other as part of a cross-licensing agreement.
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can agree upon may lead to the exclusion of some rms from the market. This suggests that
mitigating the collusive e¤ect of bilateral cross-licensing agreements may come at the cost of
increasing their exclusionary potential.
5 Concluding remarks
Our general message is that under a wide range of circumstances, bilateral agreements in an
input market among all rms competing in a product market can lead to the same outcome as
under full cooperation in the input market. This result has been shown to hold independently
of the number of rms and the nature of interactions in the product market and regardless
of whether rms are symmetric or not. This nding does not necessarily imply that bilateral
agreements in the input market reduce social welfare. First, if rms produce complements
rather than substitutes, full cooperation in the input market is socially desirable, and so
are bilateral agreements. Second, even if rms produce substitutable products, the outcome
of full cooperation in the input market can be superior to the outcome of no agreement at
all. For instance, cross-licensing of patents can lower rmsmarginal costs and lead to a
lower nal price than without cross-licensing. Third, in the case of cross-licensing of patents,
one should also take into account how cross-licensing a¤ects rms incentives to invest in
innovation.
Our setting can be extended to study other policy issues related to cross-licensing. First,
we can introduce, in addition to incumbent rms, entrants with no (or weak) patent port-
folios. This would allow us to study whether cross-licensing can be used to raise barriers
to entry (DOJ and FTC, 2007). Second, we can include in the set of players non-operating
entities which do not compete in the product market. This would allow us to study the con-
ditions under which non-operating entities weaken competition and (when these conditions
are met) to isolate the anticompetitive e¤ects generated by non-operating entities from the
e¤ects resulting from cross-licensing in their absence.29 Note that non-operating entities and
entrants involve completely opposite asymmetries. The former are present in the input mar-
ket of patent licensing but are absent in the product market whereas the second are absent
(or have very weak presence) in the input market but are present in the product market.
29The issue of how NPEs a¤ect competition and innovation is of substantial current interest to policy
makers (Scott Morton and Shapiro, 2014; FTC, 2016).
25
6 Appendix
6.1 Alternative interpretation: value-increasing innovations
Instead of assuming that access to more patents reduces a rms marginal cost, we can assume
that access to more patents increases the value of the product produced by the rm. We
below show that our model of cost-reducing innovations can be equivalently interpreted as a
model of value-increasing innovations.
We consider a constant symmetric marginal cost c for all rms. Each rm has one patent.
Let v(n) represent the value of the product produced by a rm when the rm has access to
n 2 f1; :::; Ng number of distinct patents with v(N)  v(N   1)  :::  v(1)( v). Let
v  (v1; :::; vN) be the vector representing the value of each rms product after the licensing
stage.
We dene Cournot competition for given v  (v1; :::; vN) as follows. Each rm i simulta-
neously chooses its quantity qi. Given v  (v1; :::; vN), q  (q1; :::; qN) and Q = q1+ :::+ qN ,
the quality-adjusted equilibrium prices are determined by the following two conditions:
- an indi¤erence condition:
vi   pi = vj   pj for all (i; j) 2 f1; :::; Ng2 ;
- a market-clearing condition:
Q = D(p) where pi = p+ vi   v:
In other words, p is the price for the product of a rm which has access to its own patent
only. The market clearing condition means that this price is adjusted to make the total
supply equal to the demand. The indi¤erence condition implies that the price each rm
charges is adjusted such that all consumers who buy any product are indi¤erent among all
products. A micro-foundation of this setup can be provided as follows. There is a mass one
of consumers. Each consumer has a unit demand and hence buys at most one unit among all
products. A consumers gross utility from having a unit of product of rm i is given by u+vi:
u is specic to the consumer while vi is common to all consumers. Let F (u) represent the
cumulative distribution function of u: Then, by construction of quality-adjusted prices, any
consumer is indi¤erent among all products and the marginal consumer indi¤erent between
buying any product and not buying is characterized by u+ v   p = 0, implying
D(p) = 1  F (p  v):
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In equilibrium, p is adjusted such that 1  F (p  v) = Q. Let P (Q) be the inverse demand
function. In equilibrium, a rms prot is given by
i =
 
P (Q) + vi   v   c 
X
j 6=i
ri!j
!
qi +
X
j 6=i
rj!iqj:
After making the following change of variables
c  (vi   v) = ci;
the prot can be equivalently written as
i =
 
P (Q)  ci  
X
j 6=i
ri!j
!
qi +
X
j 6=i
rj!iqj;
which is the prot expression in our original model of cost-reducing patents. Therefore,
our model of cost-reducing innovations can be equivalently interpreted as a model of value-
increasing innovations.
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume, without loss of generality, that (i; j) = (1; 2). The joint payo¤ that rms 1 and 2
derive from a deviation to a cross-licensing agreement involving the payment of (r^1!2; r^2!1)
is:
^1 + ^2 =

P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  c  r^1!2   (N   2) r q^1 + r^2!1q^2 + rQ 12
+

P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  c  r^2!1   (N   2) r q^2 + r^1!2q^1 + rQ 12
=

P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  c  (N   2) r (q^1 + q^2) + 2rQ 12:
where q^1 and q^2 satisfy the following F.O.Cs:
P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  [c+ r^1!2 + (N   2) r] + q^1P 0  Q 12 + q^1 + q^2 = 0;
P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  [c+ r2!1 + (N   2) r] + q^2P 0  Q 12 + q^1 + q^2 = 0:
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Summing these F.O.Cs yields
2P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  [c+ r^1!2 + r^2!1 + (N   2) r] + (q^1 + q^2)P 0  Q 12 + q^1 + q^2 = 0;
which shows that q^1 + q^2 depends on (r^1!2; r^2!1) only through r^1!2 + r^2!1. Combining this
with the fact that
^1 + ^2 =

P
 
Q 12 + q^1 + q^2
  c  (N   2) r (q^1 + q^2) + 2rQ 12 (19)
implies that the coalitions deviation payo¤ ^1 + ^2 depends on (r^1!2; r^2!1) only through
r^1!2 + r^2!1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We below prove that
@212
@Q212
(Q12; r) = P
00  Q12 +Q 12(r)Q12 + 2P 0  Q12 +Q 12(r) < 0:
If P 00
 
Q12 +Q

 12(r)
  0, the result follows from P 0(Q12+Q 12(r)) < 0. Suppose now that
P 00(Q12 +Q 12(r)) > 0. Then, we have
0 > P 00
 
Q12 +Q

 12(r)
 
Q12 +Q

 12(r)

+ 2P 0
 
Q12 +Q

 12(r)

> P 00
 
Q12 +Q

 12(r)

Q12 + 2P
0  Q12 +Q 12(r)
where the rst inequality follows from A1 and A3 and the second from P 00(Q12+Q 12(r)) >
0 > 0. This proves that in both cases @212=@Q212 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose rst that rm  c(N   1)   c(N). Then, the ex post usage constraint is not
binding and hence, from Proposition 2, we obtain the result that the unique bilaterally
e¢ cient symmetric royalty is r = rm.
Suppose now that rm > c(N   1)   c(N). All rms using all the technologies in the
presence of the ex post usage constraint implies that the symmetric royalty r cannot be
larger than c(N   1)   c(N): if r > c(N   1)   c(N), at least one technology will not be
used. Therefore, suppose that any distinct rms i and j agree on r  c(N   1)  c(N) and
consider the deviation of rms 1 and 2 in stage 1.
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We rst show that any r1!2 > c(N   1)   c(N) is strictly dominated by r1!2 = c(N  
1)   c(N). If r1!2 > c(N   1)   c(N), rm 1 will not use rm 2s technology in stage 2
and, therefore, will have a marginal cost c1 = c(N   1) + (N   2)r, which is the same as
its marginal cost from agreeing on r1!2 = c(N)   c(N   1) and using rm 2s technology.
Given that both royalties lead to the same marginal cost of rm 1, inducing rm 1 to use
rm 2s technology generates a higher joint prot than not using rm 2s technology. As the
same argument applies to r2!1, we can conclude that the coalition of f1; 2g will use royalties
satisfying r1!2  c(N   1)  c(N) and r2!1  c(N   1)  c(N).
Lemma 1 still applies and therefore, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention
to deviations to a symmetric royalty r1!2 = r2!1 = br  c(N   1)  c(N).
From the analysis in Section 2.4, we have
@12
@Q12
(Q12(r; r); r) = c+Nr   P (Q(r; r)) ;
and
c+Nr   P (Q(r; r)) < 0 for any r < rm:
Hence, when r = c(N   1)   c(N); the coalition has no incentive to increase Q12 locally
(starting from Q12(r; r)); it has an incentive to reduce Q12 but it cannot do so because of
the ex post usage constraint. Moreover, as we have shown that @12
@Q12
is globally decreasing
in Q12 (i.e., 12 (Q12; r) is globally concave in Q12), we can state that there is no protable
deviation.
Proof of Proposition 5
For notational simplicity, let
c(1)  c; c(2)  bc = c+ "; c(3)  c:
Proof of (i). Suppose that in the equilibrium candidate, rm 1 is the only rm active in
stage 2. Let F1!i be the net xed fee that rm i (= 2 or 3) receives from rm 1. Without
loss of generality, we assume that r1!2  r1!3. Let c1 denote rm 1s marginal cost in the
equilibrium candidate. Then, in the equilibrium candidate, rms 2 and 3 jointly obtainX
i=2;3

F1!i + r1!iqM(c1)

:
The inequality ri!1 > " must hold for i = 2; 3 in the candidate equilibrium; otherwise,
ci = bc+ ri!1  c+ 2" and, therefore, rm i would become active.
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Note that for any deviation of the coalition f2; 3g, each rm i = 2; 3 receives F1!i +
r1!iqM(c1) from rm 1 as the latter keeps producing qM(c1). Suppose now that rms 2 and
3 deviate by signing a cross-licensing agreement with r2!3 = r3!2 = 0. After the deviation,
the marginal cost of each rm i is ci = bc for i = 2; 3 because each rm i nds it optimal to
use only the technology of rm j 2 f2; 3g n fig : From
PM(c1)  PM(c) > bc;
it follows that rms 2 and 3 will be active: in stage 2, each rm i will produce qi which is a
best response to qM(c1) + qj for i; j = 2; 3 and i 6= j and make an extra positive prot, in
addition to the licensing revenue F1!i + r1!iqM(c1). Therefore, the considered deviation by
the coalition f2; 3g is protable.
Proof of (ii). Let us show that the set of bilateral cross-licensing agreements presented in
(ii) is bilaterally e¢ cient.
Note rst that the inequality c > Pm(c + ") implies that c > P d(c + ") where P d(c + ")
is the duopoly price when both rms have the same marginal cost c+ ":
Consider rst the coalition of rms 1 and 2. Note rst that even if rm 1 does not use
rm 2s technology, its marginal cost will be c1 = bc. The same is true regarding c2. This
implies that, when rms 1 and 2 deviate by changing their cross-licensing agreement, they
both remain active and rm 3 remains inactive, whatever the deviation. Given that, the
cross-licensing agreement which maximizes the joint prots of rms 1 and 2 is such that
they agree on the highest royalties consistent with the ex post usage constraint (in order to
contract their joint output and make it closer to the monopoly output). This is achieved with
r1!2 = r2!1 = ", which implies that there is no protable deviation by the coalition of rms
1 and 2.
Second, consider the coalition of rms 1 and 3. In the candidate equilibrium, rm 1s
prot is D(bc;bc)=2, i.e., half of the duopoly industry prot when (c1; c2) = (bc;bc), and rm 3s
prot is zero. As long as rm 3 is inactive, the joint prot of rms 1 and 3 is maximized by
reducing rm 1s marginal cost, which requires r1!3 = 0. Can rms 1 and 3 increase their
joint prot by inducing rm 3 to be active? The answer is no. To see why, note rst that
given that r3!2 = c bc, a lower bound of c3 is given by bc which can be achieved by r3!1 = 0.
This lower bound is the same as c1 = bc. Therefore, regardless of whether rm 3 is active or
not, the lowest marginal cost from the coalitions point of view is bc. Hence, what matters for
the coalitions payo¤ is the joint output produced at the marginal cost bc. More precisely, as
rm 2 will keep producing q2 = qD(bc;bc), its quantity in the duopoly, the best response of the
coalition of rms 1 and 3 is to produce qD(bc;bc), which is what rm 1 does when rm 3 is not
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active. Therefore, there is no protable deviation by the coalition of rms 1 and 3.
By symmetry, the coalition of rms 2 and 3 has no incentive to deviate.
Proof of Lemma 3
By G1, G2 and G3 it holds that
NP
i=1
i (x;r; F ) =
NP
i=1
i (x; r) does not depend on r for
any x. By G6, xm is then the unique solution to the system of N equations:
NX
i=1
@i
@xj
(x; r) = 0 for j 2 f1; :::; Ng ;
for any r: Therefore, if a vector r 2 D is such that
NP
i=1
@i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0 for any j 2 f1; :::; Ng,
then it must be that x (r) = xm, which implies that (i)
NX
i=1
i (x
 (r) ; r) 
NX
i=1
i (x
 (r0) ; r0)
for any r0; that is, r is fully cooperative, and (ii) the fully cooperative agreements in the input
market lead to the fully cooperative outcome in the product market.
Proof of Lemma 4
Assume that r 2 D is bilaterally e¢ cient. Then for any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; Ng2 with i 6= j, it
must hold that
@
@ri!j
i
 
~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

; ~xj
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

+
@
@ri!j
j
 
~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

; ~xj
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

= 0;
which can be rewritten as
@~xi
@ri!j
 @i
@xi
 
~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

; ~xj
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

+
@~xj
@ri!j
 @i
@xj
 
~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

; ~xj
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

+
@~xi
@ri!j
 @j
@xi
 
~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

; ~xj
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

+
@~xj
@ri!j
 @j
@xj
 
~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

; ~xj
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

;x ij (r) ; r ij

= 0
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where the arguments
 
ri!j; rj!i; r ij;x ij (r)

of @~x

i
@ri!j
and
@~xj
@ri!j
are omitted.
Using the denition of a Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of xi (r) (by G4), it is
straightforward to see that ~xi
 
ri!j; rj!i;x ij (r)

= xi (r) and that ~x

j
 
ri!j; rj!i;x ij (r)

=
xj (r). Therefore, it holds that
@~xi
@ri!j
 @i
@xi
(x (r) ; r) +
@~xj
@ri!j
 @i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) +
@~xi
@ri!j
 @j
@xi
(x (r) ; r) +
@~xj
@ri!j
 @j
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0:
By denition of the Nash equilibrium x (r), it holds that
@i
@xi
(x (r) ; r) =
@j
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0:
This yields
@~xj
@ri!j
 @i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) +
@~xi
@ri!j
 @j
@xi
(x (r) ; r) = 0:
By symmetry we also have
@~xi
@rj!i
 @j
@xi
(x (r) ; r) +
@~xj
@rj!i
 @i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0:
Denoting yij = @i@xj (x
 (r) ; r) and yji =
@j
@xi
(x (r) ; r), the latter two equations can be
rewritten as a two-equation linear system in yji and yij:(
@~xi
@ri!j
:yji +
@~xj
@ri!j
:yij = 0;
@~xi
@rj!i
:yji +
@~xj
@rj!i
:yij = 0:
If

@~xi
@ri!j
@~xj
@ri!j
@~xi
@rj!i
@~xj
@rj!i
 6= 0, then the latter system has a unique solution, given by yji = yij = 0:
Hence, we get the following: for any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; Ng2 with i 6= j, the following equation
must hold
@i
@xj
(x (r) ; r) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 7
Assume that the input price vector r122 D12 is bilaterally e¢ cient. Following the same
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steps as those of the proof of Lemma 4, we get that
@i
@xj
 
x
 
r12

; r12

= 0;
for any (i; j) 2 S1  S1[ S2  S2 with i 6= j. This implies that
X
i2S1
@i
@xj
 
x
 
r12

; r12

= 0; (20)
for any j 2 S1, and, similarly
X
i2S2
@i
@xj
 
x
 
r12

; r12

= 0; (21)
for any j 2 S2. Therefore, by G6, it must hold that x1 (r12) = ~x1  r2 1\2;x2n1 (r12),
which implies in particular thatX
i2S1
i
 
x
 
r12

; r12
 X
i2S1
i
 
x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1  r12 ;x2n1  r12 ; r1; r2 1\2
for any r1 (recall that the joint payo¤ of all the rms in S1 depends on r1 only through
x^1
 
r1; r2;x2n1 (r12)

). Then, using the fact that x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1 (r12)

= x1 (r12)
(which holds because x^1 and x1 are unique by G4and G5), we obtain thatX
i2S1
i
 
x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1 (r12)

;x2n1 (r12) ; r1; r2 1\2
 X
i2S1
i
 
x^1
 
r1; r2 1\2;x
2n1 (r12)

;x2n1 (r12) ; r1; r2 1\2

for any r1, which means that
r1 2 Argmax
r1
X
i2S1
i
 
x^1
 
r1; r2;x2n1
 
r12

;x2n1
 
r12

; r1; r2 1\2

We can show in a similar way that
r2 2 Argmax
r2
X
j2S2
j
 
x^2
 
r2;x1n2
 
r12

;x1n2
 
r12

; r1 1\2; r
2

Therefore, r12 is an intra-group fully cooperative vector of input prices.
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Proof of Proposition 8
Consider a rm j in S1\ S2. Combining (20) and (21) together with rm js F.O.C. with
respect to xj yields X
i2S
@i
@xj
 
x
 
r12

; r12

= 0;
which implies that rm js action maximizes the industry prot.
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